Physician privacy concerns when disclosing patient data for public health purposes during a pandemic influenza outbreak by El Emam, Khaled et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Physician privacy concerns when disclosing
patient data for public health purposes during a
pandemic influenza outbreak
Khaled El Emam
1,2*, Jay Mercer
3, Katherine Moreau
1, Inese Grava-Gubins
4, David Buckeridge
5,6 and
Elizabeth Jonker
1
Abstract
Background: Privacy concerns by providers have been a barrier to disclosing patient information for public health
purposes. This is the case even for mandated notifiable disease reporting. In the context of a pandemic it has been
argued that the public good should supersede an individual’s right to privacy. The precise nature of these provider
privacy concerns, and whether they are diluted in the context of a pandemic are not known. Our objective was to
understand the privacy barriers which could potentially influence family physicians’ reporting of patient-level
surveillance data to public health agencies during the Fall 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza outbreak.
Methods: Thirty seven family doctors participated in a series of five focus groups between October 29-31 2009.
They also completed a survey about the data they were willing to disclose to public health units. Descriptive
statistics were used to summarize the amount of patient detail the participants were willing to disclose, factors that
would facilitate data disclosure, and the consensus on those factors. The analysis of the qualitative data was based
on grounded theory.
Results: The family doctors were reluctant to disclose patient data to public health units. This was due to concerns
about the extent to which public health agencies are dependable to protect health information (trusting beliefs),
and the possibility of loss due to disclosing health information (risk beliefs). We identified six specific actions that
public health units can take which would affect these beliefs, and potentially increase the willingness to disclose
patient information for public health purposes.
Conclusions: The uncertainty surrounding a pandemic of a new strain of influenza has not changed the privacy
concerns of physicians about disclosing patient data. It is important to address these concerns to ensure reliable
reporting during future outbreaks.
Background
Providers under-report notifiable disease cases to public
health agencies, sometimes by wide margins [1-26] (a
summary of this literature is provided in additional file
1). Concerns about patient privacy are a key factor inhi-
biting disease reporting [6,11,13,19-21,27,28]. This is not
surprising, given that high levels of concern about infor-
mation privacy can negatively affect information disclo-
sures [29-31].
Reluctance to disclose patient information for public
health purposes exists [32], despite statutes in Canadian
jurisdictions that mandate or permit reporting of perso-
nal health information (PHI) for public health purposes
without patient consent [33]. Similarly, the US Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
P r i v a c yR u l ep e r m i t st h ed i s c l o s u r eo fP H It oap u b l i c
health authority without patient authorization [32,34-40].
It is not known whether such pre-existing privacy
concerns would be diluted in the context of an actual
pandemic influenza outbreak. Arguably, continued
patient privacy barriers to reporting during a pandemic
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tices, which need to be addressed.
While there is always a balance between individual
and collective rights, public health law provides sweep-
ing powers in the context of a public health emergency.
Some ethicists and policy makers have proposed that
the rights of the individual, particularly the right to priv-
acy of one’s personal health information, should be sub-
jugated to the collective interests of the community
w h e nt h i sw o u l dh e l pt op r e v e n ts e r i o u sh a r mt ot h a t
community [41-49]. For example, the Pandemic Influ-
enza Working Group applies this principle as a value to
guide ethical decision-making, noting that, “To protect
the public from harm, health care organizations and
public health authorities may be required to take actions
that impinge on individual liberty” [42].
We conducted a mixed-methods study around the
peak of the H1N1 outbreak between October 29-31
2009 to investigate what data Canadian family physi-
cians are willing to disclose to public health agencies for
influenza surveillance and reporting purposes, as well as
t h es p e c i f i cp r i v a c yi s s u e st h at impact the disclosure of
information. Based upon the results, we make policy
and procedural recommendations to help eliminate bar-
riers to data disclosure.
Methods
Intention to Disclose Personal Information
A number of theories and instruments have been used
to measure and explain the relationship between infor-
mation privacy concerns and individual behaviours
[30,31,50,51]. Although none have been used in the con-
text of disclosing patient information for public health
purposes, we utilized them as a starting point to articu-
late a set of constructs, and a high level set of relation-
ships among them. These guided our data collection
and analysis.
A key one is Social Contract (SC) theory, which
requires an equitable exchange and shared understand-
ing about contractual terms and self-control over the
course of a relationship [30,52,53]. In the context of
information privacy, this theory suggests that an organi-
zation’s collection of personal information is perceived
to be fair only when the individual providing personal
information is granted control over, and is informed
about the organization’s intended use of the personal
information, and the disclosure of the information is
perceived as equitable with some benefit back to the
individual [30,52-57]. This leads to three important con-
structs which have been linked to the intention to dis-
close personal information: collection, control and
awareness.
Collection, control and awareness affect the intention
to release personal information through two intervening
constructs: trusting and risk beliefs [30]. The reasoned
action paradigm states that behaviour intention is a reli-
able predictor of actual behaviour [58,59].
The trust/risk/intention model states that in situations
in which potential risks are present or perceived, trust
plays an important role in predicting an individual’s
behaviour [60,61]. Trusting beliefs refer to the degree to
which individuals believe that an organization is depend-
able to protect their personal information [62]. Risk
beliefs refer to the high possibility for loss associated
with the release of personal information to an organiza-
tion [63].
Collection, control and awareness affect trusting
beliefs [30]. Enhancing trusting beliefs will have a nega-
tive effect on risk beliefs (reduce risk perceptions), and
will consequently facilitate intention to release personal
information [30]. It has also been shown that trusting
beliefs have a direct positive effect on the intention to
release personal information [30]. Therefore, trust and
risk beliefs are intervening factors that play an impor-
tant role in facilitating or inhibiting the disclosure of
personal information.
In our study we focused on exploring how the collec-
tion, control and awareness constructs affect intention
to disclose information to public health for Influenza-
Like-Illness (ILI)/H1N1 surveillance and reporting by
affecting trusting and risk beliefs.
Fields Collected for Influenza Surveillance and Reporting
Influenza is a disease under national surveillance [64]
through many mechanisms, some of which vary from
province-to-province.
The FluWatch program collects summary data from
volunteer sentinel physicians across Canada [65]. The
data reported weekly by participating physicians include:
patient age in intervals, practice postal code, total
patients seen, and the sentinel number, which identifies
the reporting physician.
In addition, in some provinces, influenza is a reporta-
ble disease, with legislation requiring nominal reporting
of patients with influenza, although nearly all reports
are of confirmed cases from laboratories. Jurisdictions
such as Manitoba [66], Nova Scotia [67], the Northwest
Territories [68], and Ontario [69] collect: the patient’s
first name, surname, sex, full date of birth, full postal
code, practice postal code, and the physician’s name.
At the outset of the H1N1 pandemic, many provinces
deemed cases of H1N1 influenza to be reportable, how-
ever, most reports continued to be of confirmed cases
from laboratories, and follow-up was not possible for all
cases as the number of reports increased. Subsequently,
many jurisdictions required reporting for only hospita-
lized cases of H1N1 influenza. As examples, the case
report forms contained the following fields across Alberta
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n a m e ,s u r n a m e ,s e x ,d a t eo fb i r t h ,f u l lp o s t a lc o d e ,p r e g -
nancy status, asthma history, COPD history, chronic
heart disease history, and diabetes history.
Another H1N1-specific national surveillance program
coordinated by the Public Health Agency of Canada [72]
collects data directly from practice electronic medical
records (EMRs) after their customization with new tem-
plates: age, gender, pregnancy status, presence of a chronic
medical condition, such as cardiac, pulmonary, or diabetes.
In our study, we examined the willingness to disclose
the specific fields noted above, since they were collected
at some point during the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic.
Study Design
This mixed methods study used a triangulation design
[73,74] to explore what Canadian family physicians were
willing to disclose to public health agencies, as well as
the specific privacy issues that impacted the disclosure
of information. With the assistance of a trained modera-
tor, we conducted a series of five focus groups with
family physicians in Canada, and asked each focus
group participant to complete a questionnaire. The
focus groups occurred during week 41 of 2009 (October
29-31), just as widespread influenza activity was starting
to peak in Canada [75]. The study was approved by the
Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario Research Ethics
Board prior to commencement.
In terms of deciding on an adequate number of parti-
cipants and/or focus group sessions, there is no standard
that is generally accepted. However, there are a few con-
siderations that one should take into account when
deciding on the number of participants required [76,77].
Firstly, there is the consideration that there are a limited
number of viewpoints on a topic. Having a greater num-
ber of participants does not therefore necessarily entail a
greater understanding of the topic [77]. The researcher
can get a sense of how the group may be divided on an
i s s u eb e f o r ec o m m e n c i n gt h ef o c u sg r o u p sb yw a yo f
the published literature on the topic and/or by speaking
with individuals in the group of interest [77]. Although
opinions can vary, this would give the researcher an
idea of when he/she has reached saturation; the point at
which there is nothing new to be uncovered on the
topic [76,78]. Krueger and Casey suggest starting with
3-4 focus groups to uncover the range of opinions on
the topic [78]. If new ideas continue to appear, more
focus groups should be undertaken, until the point of
saturation is reached [78]. Once saturation has been
reached, further interviews or focus groups will no
longer be necessary nor particularly useful [76-78].
Secondly, the researcher’s own ability to recall, process
and understand the interviews needs to be considered
[77]. As Gaskell points out, “the interviewer must be
able to bring to mind the emotional tone of the respon-
dent and to recall why they asked a particular question”
[77]. Therefore, there is a limit to the number of
encounters that the researcher will be able to recall in
detail. For group interviews, Gaskell suggests that this
limit would be 6-8 sessions [77].
A recent literature review has noted that the median
number of focus groups conducted in health sciences
research was 5, with a median of 32 participants [79].
Consistent with the recommendations in the literature
and with precedents, we planned for five focus groups
with a maximum of eight participants in each. We
expected to reach a point of saturation in terms of new
concepts identified within that. This expectation was
partially driven by discussion with family physicians in
preparation for the focus groups whereby we observed
consistency in their views on data sharing for public
health purposes.
Study Sample
For the purposes of this study, purposive sampling was
used [80]. Participants in the focus groups were
recruited in advance of the Family Medicine Forum
(FMF) in Calgary, Alberta via email invitation. The FMF
is an annual conference of family physicians organized
by the College of Family Physicians of Canada. The
sampling strata used were years of practice (< = 5 years,
between 6 and 10 years, and > 10 years), gender, loca-
tion (rural vs. urban) and region of Canada (East, Cen-
tral, West). The recruitment target was 8 participants
for each of the five focus groups. Assuming a 33% no
show rate, we aimed for 60 registrations. Invitations
were sent to registered FMF delegates by email in
advance of the conference, ensuring that all the strata
were covered among those invited. Invited delegates
self-selected to participate in the study.
The invitation email was sent by the College of Family
Physicians of Canada. The email had basic information
a b o u tt h es t u d ya n dal i n kt oaw e bp a g ew i t ha ne l e c -
tronic consent form. The electronic consent form
included a description of the study and its procedures, a
description of withdrawal rights, data confidentiality,
and information on how to contact the first author and
the REB chair. Respondents could then enter their name
and email address, and select the most suitable time for
them for a focus group. By completing the form the
respondents indicated their consent to participate.
A total of 37 Canadian family physicians participated
in the study.
Data Collection
The focus group sessions were conducted in a private
meeting room at the FMF. At most two focus group ses-
sions were held per day during the three day conference.
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were asked to complete a short questionnaire on paper
to gather their views on data sharing. The questions
included in both the questionnaire and focus group
guide were constructed based upon the literature, our
anecdotal experiences with the data sharing practices of
physicians, and a pilot study with four physicians, who
provided us with additional feedback and information.
The questionnaire and focus group guide consisted of
two components. The first asked about willingness to
disclose certain data elements to public health, and con-
tained 15 items. These were the data elements that we
found in current ILI/H1N1 case report forms used
across the country. A set of 14 factors that we hypothe-
sized would increase the willingness to disclose the
above information were included in the second compo-
n e n to ft h ed a t ac o l l e c t i o nt o o l s .W eu s e das e m a n t i c
differential scale [81] where a score of 1 meant “less
willing to share data” and a score of 7 meant “more will-
ing to share data” with public health.
For both the questionnaire and focus group guide, we
formulated a scenario to ground the participants in a
realistic example. In the scenario, the participants
assumed that they had been requested to provide
patient-level data to a municipal public health unit for
the purpose of surveillance of ILI, specifically, H1N1
surveillance. As part of the scenario, we told participants
that only individual level data on the patients who meet
a particular case definition would be disclosed to the
public health unit, as well as denominator totals. They
were also informed that, in some jurisdictions, this
reporting was mandatory.
Quantitative Data Analysis
The questionnaire responses were transcribed into SAS.
Ten percent of the questionnaires were randomly
selected and cross-checked against the data entered in
SAS by a different person than that who transcribed the
data to check for systematic errors.
We first computed descriptive statistics on the ques-
tionnaire responses to understand the central tendency
of the responses and variation to gauge consensus. The
objective of that analysis was to document the fields
that the participants were willing to disclose to public
health, the factors that would change their willingness
to disclose, and to understand if variation in participant
responses can be explained by years of practice experi-
ence and gender.
Since some of the items in each section of the ques-
tionnaire are expected to be strongly related, we also
grouped them into a smaller set to help with interpreta-
tion. To do so, we computed the mean absolute differ-
ence between each pair of items (105 pairs for the first
part of the questionnaire, and 91 pairs for the second
part). We used the difference instead of a product
moment correlation for two reasons. First, the responses
on two items could be strongly correlated but very dif-
ferent. It would not be appropriate to combine two
items if they were different. Second, if the absolute dif-
ference were small, then it meant that the scores of the
two items were close to the 45 degree positive diagonal,
which implied a high positive correlation. The three cri-
teria used for grouping elements were: (a) a mean abso-
lute difference less than 1, (b) the grouping of items was
meaningful, and (c) the group was consistent in its scor-
ing (for example, if the difference between items
between B and C was larger than the difference between
items A and B, and A and C, then that three item
grouping would not be consistent). Regarding criterion
(b) the judgement was subjective, but it was almost
always obvious. For example, grouping a high willing-
ness to share the patient’s first name with a high will-
ingness to share a patient’s COPD history would not be
meaningful, but grouping the first name with the last
name is more meaningful. Regarding criterion (c) we
used the consistency ratio from the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) to quantitatively evaluate the consistency
among pairwise comparisons [82,83]. AHP is a widely
used multi-attribute decision making methodology
which utilizes comparisons by experts. Within AHP an
analyst computes an index based on a matrix of pairwise
comparisons and compares it to the value from a ran-
dom matrix. The greater the consistency the closer the
index is to zero. A ratio greater than 0.1 is considered
representative of excessive inconsistency.
After grouping the items, we had a profile of
responses for each participant on each of the two ques-
tionnaire sections. To understand whether the differ-
ences among participants were related to their years of
practice and gender, we needed to define profile similar-
i t ym e a s u r e s .T h e r ea r et h r e ew a y st oe v a l u a t ep r o f i l e
similarity: shape, elevation, and scatter, as illustrated in
Figure 1[84]. Shape pertained to the pattern of
responses to the items. Two profiles had the same shape
if their responses were correlated. Elevation pertained to
the proclivity of a participant to be willing to share
information in the first part of the questionnaire, and
items
score
shape
elevation
}
scatter
Figure 1 Illustration of profile elevation, shape, and scatter.
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information in the second part. It was measured by
using the mean score across all of the items. Scatter per-
tained to their variability in responses, and was mea-
sured as the range of item responses.
To assess differences in shape, we first grouped
response profiles using a hierarchical clustering algo-
rithm. The linkage method was Ward’s [85]. The simi-
larity measure among participants was the correlation
coefficient. The emergent groups were compared on
their mean years of experience, using a one-way
ANOVA, and on gender using a chi-square test. This
told us if the respondents differed by years of practice
or gender in their response shape. The analysis was
repeated using a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA,
which provided a more robust test of medians across
groups.
To assess if years of practice or gender were asso-
ciated with elevation, we computed the correlation coef-
ficient between the mean scores of each participant and
years of practice, and compared males vs. females on
mean scores using a t-test. Similarly, to assess if years of
practice or gender were associated with scatter, we com-
puted the correlation coefficient between the score
range of each participant and years of practice, and
compared males vs. females on score range using a t-
test. All statistical significance tests were performed at a
two-tailed alpha level of 0.05.
Qualitative Data Analysis
The focus groups were audio-taped and transcribed ver-
batim. We used an approach informed by grounded the-
ory [86,87] to analyze them. The objective of the
analysis was to understand the reasons why the partici-
pating physicians were unwilling to share selected data
elements. Data analysis began immediately after the first
focus group session, and continued until a set of stable
themes developed. Following each focus group session,
the trained facilitator, assistant facilitator, and note taker
engaged in a debriefing meeting, and conducted a cur-
sory analysis of the audio recordings and field notes
from the session. In this meeting, they revised, added, or
removed selected open-ended questions in preparation
for the next focus group session. As such, the questions
used in each focus group were slightly different and
became increasingly specific as the concepts needed to
develop an understanding of physicians’ perceptions
about providing patient-level data to public health in
the context of a pandemic disease outbreak became
evident.
Using the constant comparison method [87], as well as
the above-mentioned constructs from the literature, we
also developed, modified, and agreed upon a coding
scheme that embraced the themes presented in the data.
Two research team members trained in qualitative
research methods independently coded the transcripts
using NVivo software and an inductive process. Once
the members completed their independent coding, they
shared and compared their coding, as well as discussed
the accuracy of it. At this point, they modified, merged,
or eliminated codes and revised their analyses.
Results
Participants
Forty three physicians registered to participate in the
focus groups, and 37 showed up. This amounts to an
86% participation rate, which is slightly higher than the
participation rate we had assumed in the design (40/60
at 66%).
The 37 participants had a mean of 16.3 years of prac-
tice experience, with a maximum of 43. The overall
family physician population summary data from the
2007 National Physician Survey (NPS) [88] reported that
the mean years of practice experience was 19.6, with a
maximum of 55 years.
T h e r ew e r e2 4f e m a l e( 6 5 % )a n d1 3m a l e( 3 5 % )p a r t i -
cipants. The 2007 NPS reported 60% of family physi-
cians are male and 40% female.
The distribution by province was: 18 from Western
Canada (49%), 14 from Central Canada (Ontario and
Quebec - 39%), and 5 from Eastern Canada (13.5%).
The 2007 NPS reported that approximately 35% of
family physicians practice in Western Canada, 59% in
Central Canada, and 9.3% in Eastern Canada.
Compared to the physician population, our partici-
pants had slightly less practice experience, and were
more likely to be female. Furthermore, physicians from
Central Canada were under-represented whereas physi-
cians from other regions of the country were over-
represented.
Quantitative Results
The results for the questions on which types of fields
the physicians would be willing to disclose are provided
in Table 1. There was strongr e l u c t a n c et op r o v i d e
patient names, a weak willingness to provide dates of
birth, postal codes, and initials, a moderate willingness
to reveal their own names, the number of patients in
their practice, and clinical information about the
patients, and a stronger willingness to share patient sex,
the total number of patients seen during the reporting
period, and the practice postal code. The least consen-
sus was in their willingness to share the patients’ postal
codes, date of birth, initials, and the most consensus
was on their willingness to disclose the patients’ sex.
If we assume that the willingness to disclose is posi-
tively associated with perceived sensitivity of the infor-
mation, then there was the most consensus on the least
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fields. This would be the expected pattern.
We grouped the following items: (a) items A1 and
A2, (b) items A7 to A11, and (c) items A14 and A15.
Those in group (a) pertain to the patient’s name, and
the participants didn’t see much difference between
disclosing the first and second name. The items in
group (b) pertain to underlying conditions. The partici-
pants treated all of the underlying conditions equally
in terms of willingness to disclose and did not provide
an indication that they differ in their sensitivity. The
items in group (c) pertain to summary information
about the practice. Group (b) had a consistency ratio
below 0.1 (consistency does not apply to the other
groups with only two items).
Table 2 shows the willingness to share less/more
information under certain conditions. The factors that
had little impact on their willingness to disclose infor-
mation to public health were: linking the data to other
data sets, whether the public health unit was provincial,
federal or municipal, and the type of condition or dis-
ease that was under surveillance. The factors that had
the largest influence on their willingness to share infor-
mation were: their commitment not to share the data
with other parties, and whether the reporting was man-
datory. Other factors that would have an important
effect on their willingness to disclose information
included if the data was de-identified, if their Colleges
endorsed the disclosure, if feedback was provided, if the
disclosure was only for a limited period and afterwards
the data would be destroyed, and if a research ethics
board approved the data collection. None of the factors
would actively dissuade them from sharing data, but
that was largely a function of the wording of the
questions.
The following items had a mean absolute difference
smaller than one point and were grouped: (a) B1 and
B2, (b) B5 and B6, and (c) B10 and B11. The items in
group (a) pertain to the jurisdiction of the public health
agency. The physicians did not differentiate between
f e d e r a lo rp r o v i n c i a lj u r i s dictions. The items in group
(b) pertain to exerting control over the data through de-
identification, and limits on sharing with third parties,
which they perceived as having equal impact on willing-
ness to share information. The items in group (c) per-
tain to independent oversight, irrespective of who
provides it.
We did not find any statistically significant differences
nor associations among the participant profile shape,
elevation, or scatter and the physicians’ years of practice
experience and gender. This means that variation in
years of practice experience and gender do not explain
variations in the participant responses to the questions.
Qualitative Results
The qualitative findings are organized into six themes.
Each theme presents a coherent issue, although it may
cover multiple constructs.
Physician-Patient Relationship
Some participants believed that the government and
their requests for information and data were interfering
with patient-physician relationships. Many agreed with
one physician, who stated: “We have to remember that
as family doctors, we have a real responsibility to the
patient...What are the patients going to start thinking
about, you know, where are they getting this information?
Who is telling the government or the newspaper about
me? Or my family or the neighbour? So I think we have
to really, you know, be careful of the patient [who] comes
to us, they trust us. They want to have trust in us, and
there is nobody else that can fill that role other than the
family doctor.”
In particular, this issue of trust and the patient-physi-
cian relationship was of concern to physicians serving
aboriginal or minority populations: “Im e a n ,y o um a y
find, depending on ethnicity of the people we work with,
whether they are First Nations or whether they are, I
work with a fairly ... large immigrant population, and
there’s sometimes complete lack of trust, you know,
depending on, especially if you start tracking demo-
graphic data. People sort of start to wonder, right, what’s
happening.”
Table 1 Descriptive summary of the responses on the
type of information that the physicians would be willing
to share
Information to Share Mean Std.
Dev.
A1 Patient’s first name 2.8 2
A2 Patient’s surname 2.5 2
A3 Patient’s initials 4.3 2.3
A4 Patient’s sex 6.6 0.6
A5 Patient’s full date of birth 4.2 2.3
A6 Patient’s full postal code 4.8 2.5
A7 Indication of whether the patient is pregnant 6.2 1.3
A8 Patient’s diabetes history 5.7 1.7
A9 Patient’s asthma history 5.7 1.7
A10 Patient’s COPD history 5.7 1.7
A11 Patient’s CHF history 5.7 1.7
A12 Your practice postal code 6.2 1.4
A13 Your name 5.22 2.1
A14 Total number of active patients in the practice 5.7 1.7
A15 Total number of patients seen during the
reporting period
6.2 1.3
A score of 1 means “not willing to share”, a score of 7 means “very willing to
share”, and neutral value was coded as 4.
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possibly complaining about them or suing them, if they
inappropriately disclosed information. One participant
told a story of being contacted by a patient’s lawyer,
after data was abstracted from the patient’sc h a r ta n d
entered into a provincial registry.
Physician Confidentiality
In the focus group discussion, a not insignificant
amount of mistrust between physicians and “govern-
ment authorities” was also apparent. Specifically, some
participating physicians were concerned that the data
that they provided to public health was being, or would
be linked to their performances as physicians: “Ic o u l d
see some [physicians] being a bit concerned...if [data]
were linked to some performance evaluation, like, are
you not picking up enough...” and “I have a few letters
from the ministry over the years, telling me that I was
more than two standard deviations outside the norm,
but I do palliative care, so I do too many house calls
apparently, because I do home palliative care, and you
get a couple of those letters, and they ask you to justify
your practice, and it makes you feel a little bit paranoid
about, you know, big brother watching.”
Furthermore, the weak data handling practices of
organizations that collect data from physicians have
amplified this lack of trust: “I think there is a great deal
of mistrust between physicians and the bodies that col-
lect data. In [our province], every time we write a pre-
scription, and the patient takes that prescription to a
pharmacy and the prescription is filled, it enters to the
[central pharmacy] database. And the provincial govern-
ment has been working very hard to link the medical ser-
vices plan, physician billing data, [central pharmacy
database], and hospital data. And they ran into some
really serious privacy concerns [linking] those adminis-
trative databases at the patient level, or even at the phy-
sician level without consent... The problem is there has
been several scandals in my province where hard drives,
or laptops or documents that should have been shredded
have been discovered, turned over to the media or you
know have been, have been not adequately looked after
... you have one or two of those mistakes and immedi-
ately everybody says, oh well, you know, we can’tt r u s t
that all this data that we’re sending up the food chain
all the time is actually being properly managed.”
Poor data handling practices and breaches by govern-
ment data recipients, even if they are not at public
health agencies, have made some participants concerned
about disclosing health information to public health.
De-identification and Notice
When disclosing data to public health where direct
contact with the patient would not be necessary, for
example, indicator-based surveillance efforts for situa-
tional awareness, the general consensus was that the
data needs to be de-identified. Many of the physicians
reiterated the fact that they “would be uncomfortable
providing patient identifying data ... if it could be
linked personally to any of [their] patients, that is,
Table 2 Descriptive summary of the responses on the questions on the factors that would influence the physicians’
data sharing practices
Factors Influencing Sharing Mean Std.
Dev.
B1 The data collector was a provincial ministry of health or agency rather than a municipal public health unit 4.4 1.3
B2 The data collector is Health Canada/Public Health Agency of Canada rather than a municipal public health unit 4.6 1.4
B3 The data will be linked with other administrative and clinical databases by the public health unit 4.2 1.4
B4 The disclosure of the data to the public health unit has been approved by a research ethics board 5.8 1.3
B5 The data will be appropriately de-identified before it is sent to the public health unit 5.8 1.6
B6 A commitment is made by the data collector not to share the data with any other third party 6 1.4
B7 The disclosure of the data to the public health unit is mandated by law 6.4 1.2
B8 The disclosure of the data is for a limited duration and will cease afterwards 5.7 1.3
B9 The public health unit informs the public (e.g., through their web site or newspaper advertisements) that this type of
information will be collected from their family physician
5.1 1.5
B10 The disclosure of the information has been cleared/approved by the provincial college of physicians and surgeons 5.8 1.4
B11 The disclosure of the information is endorsed/supported by the CFPC and/or the provincial college of family physicians 5.8 1.4
B12 The public health unit will provide regular custom feedback reports to your practice about disease activity in your area and
patient risk
5.7 1.2
B13 The data will be used for research purposes by the public health unit collecting the data (rather than just for public health
surveillance)
5 1.4
B14 The disease being monitored is different (i.e., it is not influenza but say an STD or a chronic disease) 4.3 1.3
A score of 1 means “less willing to share data”, a score of 7 means “more willing to share data” with public health, and a score of 4 means that the factor has no
influence on their sharing decisions.
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anonymous.”
Throughout the discussions, there was also variation
in how patient information should be de-identified (for
example, including or not including postal codes) and as
such, the need for clear guidelines on what constitutes
de-identified patient information was expressed.
De-identification by itself, however, was not seen as
enough. Engaging the patients in the disclosure decision
was suggested as “the patient needs to have a role in [the
disclosure]. They need to say, that is okay”. Several of the
participating physicians suggested the need for obtaining
individual consent by stating that “confidentiality and
privacy is not a mass issue, it’s an individual issue, so the
individual should be informed specifically” whereas
others stated that, “There has to be explicit consent, it
cannot be implied consent. Just because I saw this doctor,
the information will be transferred to public health.
That’s not acceptable”. That said, many physicians also
stated that obtaining individual consent was generally
seen as not practical as “most of [them] don’t have the
time to spend explaining patient consent for something
like this.” However, other participants thought that the
consent processes could be more general, for example,
posters in the physicians’ offices notifying patients that
their de-identified information may be released to public
health agencies. This was seen as a more practical alter-
native to obtaining individual consent.
Where reporting of influenza or ILI is mandated, pub-
lic health agencies require the disclosure of detailed
information about the patient, such as their name and
address. Some of our participants were uncomfortable
providing such detailed information: “I think the bottom
line for most family physicians is we will not share
names, addresses, or phone numbers, period, without
individual patient consent,... for the most part, what we
would probably be willing to share is the de-identified,
already anonymized aggregate data. I don’tt h i n ki t ’s
realistic to expect any family physician to breach confi-
dentiality and share information.” This is consistent
with the literature showing under-reporting for notifi-
able diseases. Of course, contact tracing or other investi-
gations that require public health to communicate
directly with the patients would not be possible without
identifying information. In such cases, some of the fac-
tors discussed below (such as articulating the purpose,
data sharing agreements, andp a t i e n tb e n e f i t )w o u l db e
important to address the physician concerns about dis-
closing patient-identifying information.
Constraints on Disclosure
Physicians were reluctant to provide certain types of
patient data because they did not know for what pur-
p o s et h ed a t aw e r eb e i n g ,o rw o u l db e ,u s e df o ra n d
who it might be shared with afterwards. For example,
one participant said, “Well I’m concerned about how
they might use it....I mean if they use the data for their
own internal operations, that’sf i n e ,b u ti ft h e yw a n tt o
s h a r ei tw i t han o n - h e a l t h c a r ea g e n c y ,Id o n ’tt h i n k
that’sf i n e ”. Likewise, another stated, “We should have
the right to know why they are using [it], and what are
the reason[s] for collecting and what the data is for.”
The majority of participating physicians also stated
that if they knew how the data that they provided was
being used, they would be more motivated to provide
additional data: “If you see the end of it. The benefit from
the data, so you see the results of the data being pro-
cessed, then you might be more willing to join in to help-
ing the gathering of the data”.
Participating physicians stated that they would like to
have a comprehensive data sharing agreement with pub-
lic health agencies prior to disclosing any patient-level
data. Included in this data sharing agreement, physicians
would like to see information about how the data would
be used (for what purpose), how long the data will be
kept, as well as who will have access to it. These agree-
ments would not only provide the physicians with,
“assurances that data will not be used for things beyond
t h eu s eo ft h ea g e n c yi t ’sg o i n gt o ” but also help to “get
physicians involved”, and make them feel more “comfor-
table to comply”.
Patient Benefit
Participating physiciansq u e s t i o n e dh o wt h ed a t a
requested by public health agencies would benefit their
patients: “What benefit would it offer to the individual
[patient] for us to release their private health data?
What does public health have to offer them that’sg o i n g
to be of benefit to them?” and “Does public health really
need to know this information? And can they show us a
very clear pathway of how the information can either
improve patient care or patient outcomes?” As t r o n g e r
incentive than general benefit to the population was also
seen as important. For example, one participant stated
“Patients look to us to be their expert and to be their
advocate. So, we, as physicians, are happy to provide the
information to public health for the greater good for pub-
lic health, for the country as a whole, but on the other
hand, in return we need to be given something of value
that we can give to our patients, so we don’t feel like we
are compromising our patients.” Another stated, “As long
[as the data] is going to benefit the patient, it shouldn’t
just be for the sake of research or somebody’s PhD thesis.
It has to benefit the patient.”
In the specific context of the H1N1 pandemic, partici-
pants questioned the benefit to their patients of disclos-
ing information: “In a situation where, medication is
unlikely to be a great deal of benefit, the immunization
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benefit would it offer to the individual for us to release
their private data to public health? What does public
health have to offer them, that’s going to be of benefit to
them? A whole bunch of nothing, right ? So, so we are
not in a situation where we can therefore justify releasing
that information.”
This suggests that being clear about the uses of the
data is a necessary, but insufficient condition for the
physicians to be willing to disclose patient information.
The link to patient benefit needs to be articulated
clearly when information is requested, and has to be
adequately demonstrated.
Communication and Feedback
Historically, physicians have indicated that they have not
received sufficient feedback from public health agencies
[7,19,89], and many participants reiterated this fact in
the focus group discussions. This insufficient communi-
cation often results in physicians who are unmotivated
to provide the data. The lack of feedback to physicians
was articulated by statements, such as: “The region I’m
in, we don’t, we have to call public [health], we have to
harass them to get any kind of information. If I happen
to not watch the news that day, I’ml e s si n f o r m e dt h a n
my patients, as to what’s happening, you know, we feel
like we have to run after them in order to get any infor-
mation, and that’s specific to this, you know, this recent
issue. But generally, I don’t feel like we get regular
updates as to what is happening in the community. It’s
like it is always a matter of take, take, take from us. And
rarely do we get to see what comes of that”.M o r e o v e r ,
for those who have provided data to public health: “It’s
just a matter of, or the fact that we keep giving them
stuff, and we don’t get anything in return, we get no
communication in return.”
Therefore, even if the purpose of the collection is
clear, and the link to patient benefit is clear, the feed-
back to physicians has to actually regularly happen after-
wards. In the context of the H1N1 pandemic, a typical
comment was, “I think the only thing I have seen with
the H1N1 thing is that we’ve had fairly poor communi-
cation from public health to physicians, I don’tk n o wi f
anyone else has had that, but even our, our, our, our
provincial head of the public health wrote us all a letter,
and said if you got any concerns, you can email me or
fax me, but then he didn’t provide any phone numbers
or fax”.
The format of the feedback is also important. For
example, in terms of information formatting, physicians
would like, “Large format. Simple, easy to understand
numbers”, “concise, something... [they] can read”,a n d
“One page. [We’ll] read one page”. Several physicians
also stated that they would like to control the quantity,
type, and frequency of feedback and information they
receive, and as such, an Internet-based information
repository that is regularly updated with local informa-
tion would be highly beneficial. For the most part, the
participating physicians are particularly interested in
obtaining clinically relevant information that they can
use to provide better service to their patients: “So, clini-
cally relevant information, so, for example, if [public
health agencies] are seeing a larger volume in your com-
munity, that’s helpful to me, because maybe, for exam-
ple, mine, it might look different. And public health is in
the unique position that they are receiving all this infor-
mation, but they may be disseminating numbers, and
what we want to know is clinically relevant information.
If you have that information, is it possible for you to
package it in a way that for clinicians it is useful to us?”
On the other hand, there was also concern expressed
about too much repetitive information being provided
by public health [90]. For example, one participant
noted “I’m on the other side where I’m being bombarded
with useless flyers, useless [expletive] flyers, like I don’t
want to open, like I see the email address and I’m at the
point where I kind of briefly open it, then delete it ... it’s
useless and it takes so much time. They add in all of
their letterhead, all of the little pictures that take,
depending on where you are, you are using dial up inter-
net that takes forever to downlo a d ,. . .t h i si sn o tu s e f u l .
This is what we mean by useful information. Just text,
that we can get anywhere, factual information and
u p d a t e sa st ow h a t ’s happening, [the] repetitive hand
washing posters are not helpful. I got it, I got it.”
Discussion
Summary and Recommendations
Despite calls for weighting the public good more heavily
in the context of a pandemic [41-48], physicians did not
see it that way: their privacy reservations remained quite
strong. Our results can be represented in the conceptual
model of Figure 2. The collection/control/awareness box
includes a list of recommended actions, mostly for pub-
lic health agencies who wish to collect the data from
family physicians. These actions would have a positive
impact on the trusting beliefs that we found in our
study, and a negative impact on the risk beliefs that we
found. Trusting beliefs positively influence the intention
to disclose patient information, and risk beliefs nega-
tively influence it. Higher trusting beliefs reduce risk
beliefs.
Trusting Beliefs
Three factors increased the degree to which the physi-
cians perceived public health as dependable to protect
health information, and that make up the trusting beliefs
construct. The first is the degree to which public health
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T1). Stories in the press about data breaches at, or by
public health agencies and health departments [91-97]
reduce trusting beliefs. Second, the data must not be
used for any purposes other than those for which it was
originally collected from the physicians (factor T2). Even
though privacy legislation in some jurisdictions does per-
mit uses different from those under which the data was
collected [33], the exercise of such discretions may erode
trusting beliefs. Third, the data disclosed by the physi-
cians is not shared with other third parties (factor T3).
Risk beliefs
Four factors increase the possibility of perceived loss
from disclosing the information, and these make up the
risk beliefs construct. The first is damage to the physi-
cian patient relationship (factor R1), which can result in
patients changing their behaviors to protect privacy.
There is evidence that patients will adopt privacy pro-
tective behaviors when seeking care, if they have con-
cerns about how their personal health information will
be used or shared. For example, between 15% and 17%
of US adults have changed their behavior to protect the
privacy of their PHI, doing things such as: going to
another doctor, paying out-of-pocket, even when
insured, to avoid disclosure, not seeking care to avoid
disclosure to an employer, giving inaccurate or incom-
plete information on medical history, self-treating or
self-medicating, rather than seeing a provider, or asking
a doctor not to write down the health problem or
record a less serious or embarrassing condition
[98-101]. Privacy concerns have caused individuals to
not be totally honest with their health care provider
[102]. More than a quarter of teenagers indicated that
they would not seek out health care if they had concerns
about the confidentiality of their information [103]. A
survey of service members who had been on active duty
found that respondents were concerned that if they
received treatment for their mental health problems, it
would not be kept confidential and would have a nega-
tive impact on future job assignments and career
advancement [104]. It has been estimated that 586,000
Americans did not seek earlier cancer treatment, and
2.07 million Americans did not seek treatment for men-
tal illness due to privacy concerns, and fear of harm to
job prospects or other life opportunities, if the informa-
tion was not kept confidential [105]. In a survey of phy-
sicians in the US, nearly 87% reported that a patient had
asked that information be kept out of their record, and
nearly 78% of physicians said that they had withheld
information from a patient’s record due to privacy con-
cerns [106]. Public opinion surveys in Canada found
that, over the prior year, between 3-5% of Canadians
have withheld information from their provider because
of privacy concerns, and 1-3% have decided not to seek
care for the same reasons [107]. Furthermore, between
11% and 13% of Canadians have, at some point, with-
held information from a health care provider because of
concerns over whom the information might be shared,
or how it might be used [108-110], with the highest
regional percentage being in Alberta, at 20% [108]. Simi-
lar results have been reported by the Canadian Medical
Association [111]. An estimated 735,000 Canadians
decided not to see a health care provider because of
concerns about the privacy of their information [112].
Specific vulnerable populations have reported similar
privacy protective behaviors, such as adolescents, people
with HIV, or who are at high risk for HIV, women
undergoing genetic testing, mental health patients, and
battered women [113].
The second risk beliefs factor (R2) is that of patient
complaints or legal action if they are surprised by, or
disapprove of how, and to whom their information is
being disclosed. Disclosures by providers without indivi-
dual patient consent have resulted in tortious or con-
tractual claims of invasion of privacy, breach of
confidentiality, or implied statutory violations under
state law [114]. Concerns about their own privacy, and
how their patient information could potentially be used
against them is the third risk beliefs factor (R3) [115].
The lack of time to complete case report forms for public
health has been an on-going problem [6,11,13,17,116].
The risks of investing scarce time, and disclosing their
patients’ information without getting back regular,
actionable, and clear clinically relevant information from
public health makes up the fourth risk factor (R4). This
risk factor reflects the balance between costs and bene-
fits: physicians would perceive less risk if the costs to
provide information were mitigated by benefits. Of
course, the lower the costs the better, or if someone else
can cover these costs.
Figure 2 A conceptual model summarizing our results.T h e
“+ve” and “-ve” indicate the direction of the relationship. The codes
in the square parentheses are used to reference elements of the
model from the main text.
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Based upon our results, we can make six recommenda-
tions of actions that public health agencies can take to
influence the trusting and risk beliefs of family physi-
cians. These would then, in turn, have a positive impact
upon their willingness to disclose patient information.
The recommendations make up the collection/control/
awareness constructs on our conceptual model.
Canadian public opinion research has found that
patients prefer to be provided for some form of opt-in
or opt-out consent before their personal health informa-
tion is used for secondary purposes (such as public
health) [117-123]. While some of our study participants
advocated obtaining patient consent for disclosing their
information to public health, it was generally seen as
not practical [124], especially if there is a pandemic with
many cases requiring reporting. Automation may ease
the reporting burden [125-128]. For example, electronic
transmission of disease information from family physi-
cian practices participating in sentinel networks to pub-
lic health units for disease surveillance is becoming
common [129-131], and the deployment of EMRs is also
growing [132-140]. Furthermore, the ability to electroni-
cally submit syndromic surveillance data to public health
is one of the EMR “meaningful use” criteria in the US
[141]. It remains an empirical question whether, in prac-
tice, time not spent on actual reporting due to automa-
tion could be used instead to obtain consent. Even if
consent can be obtained with minimal impact on time,
there is compelling evidence that consent results in
biased data, because consenters and non-consenters dif-
fer on important demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics [142].
In reality, patients are only given notice about data
being reported to public health rather than being offered
an opt-in or opt-out consent. For instance, when disease
notification is mandated, physicians are reporting fully
identifiable information, and it is expected that public
health will follow-up with the patients. According to the
participants in our focus groups, it is common practice
among reporting physicians to inform the affected
patients that public health has been notified, and that
they may initiate contact tracing and disease control
efforts with them directly.
In situations where collecting identifiable patient
information (such as patient names) is not mandated,
public health may still want those fields to link with
other data sets [49]. Informing the patients during the
encounter would likely require explanations of why this
is happening, and who the data is going to. This would
start to resemble obtaining consent in terms of effort
required, and raises the question of what to do if the
patient objects. Based upon the views of our partici-
pants, not informing the patients at all would likely not
be acceptable. Under such circumstances, it may be pos-
sible for public health to deploy secure linking methods
that do not require the disclosure of identifiable infor-
mation [143].
Not all surveillance efforts need personally identifiable
fields, (i.e. patient names and addresses), for example, as
in indicator-based surveillance programs. In such cases,
de-identified patient data can be disclosed. The public is
more comfortable with their health information being
used for secondary purposes if it is de-identified at the
earliest opportunity [118,119,122,144-148]. There is no
legislative requirement to obtain consent if the informa-
tion disclosed is de-identified. Recent indicator-based
surveillance efforts have required the de-identification of
patient data before it was disclosed [72,149,150].
Therefore, it is recommended that, wherever possible,
data disclosed by physicians should be de-identified (fac-
tor C1) and that public health should provide notices for
physicians to post in their offices informing their
patients that de-identified information will be disclosed
f o rs p e c i f i cp u b l i ch e a l t hp u rposes (factor C2). Further-
more, to the extent that public health agencies can use
the media to educate the public that their health infor-
mation is being disclosed for public health purposes,
then this could be another method of providing notice.
De-identification must mask the origin of the data as
well. This will hide the practice which generated the
data, and would address the physicians’ concerns about
how they themselves will be affected by data sharing.
There has been concern expressed about the impact
upon the physicians themselves of disclosing patient
information [11,151], in the context of being targeted by
marketers, for example, or if the physician’s information
is being used to evaluate compliance with clinical prac-
tice guidelines, compliance with pay for performance
programs, and concerns that their income could be
affected if complete patient data from their practices
was disclosed [152].
The location of the reporting practice is important to
identify geographic patterns in a disease outbreak. To
ensure that location is still known, even if the practice
identity is masked, practices can report as a group, with
each group consisting of a set of geographically adjacent
practices. A protocol and system for the secure compu-
tation of case counts from physician practices for the
purpose of surveillance has been developed [115].
Reporting as a group of practices can potentially make it
more difficult for public health to identify the source of
unusual spikes. This protocol therefore allows the public
health unit to rank the data sources by their counts and
hence initiate additional focused data gathering.
Our participants also indicated that they would be more
m o t i v a t e dt od i s c l o s ed a t ai ft h e yw e r ep r o v i d e dw i t h
actionable, regular, and clinically relevant information
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cial for their patients (e.g., timely alerts when there are
local outbreaks, instead of first getting the information
from the media and their patients). The lack of infor-
mation back from public health agencies has been an
on-going issue inhibiting willingness to disclose data
[7,19,23,125,153-155]. This is captured by the benefit
factor C3 and feedback factor C4. Such feedback
would provide a tangible short-term benefit to the
physicians in exchange for the data. There do exist
examples of context specific public health alerts inte-
grated with EMRs [156].
The support of the professional Colleges could be
helpful in two respects (factor C5). First, they could per-
form the legal review of a standard data sharing agree-
ment with public health to ensure that it adequately
covers all the important elements noted above, and pro-
tects the interests of the physicians. They can also pro-
vide external validation that the data to be collected is
indeed required for the stated public health purposes,
and is the minimum necessary to achieve these pur-
poses. The “general limiting principles” in privacy laws
stipulate that personal information should be collected,
used, or disclosed only where no other information will
serve the purpose [157].
Although some participants indicated that they would
like to see research ethics review boards endorsing dis-
closures to public health, this is not likely to be practi-
cal, given that many REBs are already under-resourced.
Furthermore, the underlying concern is with indepen-
dent external validation, which can be provided by the
professional Colleges.
Data sharing agreements between physicians and pub-
lic health should be put in place (factor C6). Agree-
ments would be beneficial for individual case reporting,
as well as surveillance for situational awareness. The
agreements would explain why the information is being
collected (for what purpose), how it will be used, who
would have access to that information, limits on disclo-
sures to third parties, restrictions on attempts at re-
identification for de-identified data, how long it will be
retained, and provide assurances that good information
security practices will be put in place to manage the
data. Although putting such agreements into place with
a large number of physicians and physician practices
would be time consuming, this would be a good invest-
ment to increase willingness to share information and
increase reporting.
Limitations
O u rf o c u sg r o u ps t u d yc o l l e c t e dd a t af r o mo n l y3 7
family physicians. While this can be considered a small
sample, we did reach a point of saturation during the
study whereby later focus groups were not contributing
new factors to the evolving model of information disclo-
sure. Therefore, it is not obvious that the addition of
more focus group sessions would have provided addi-
tional information. Furthermore, the size of our focus
groups and their number is consistent with the consid-
erable precedent in the health sciences research litera-
ture [79] and recommendations in the qualitative
research literature [76-78].
Compared to the physician population, our partici-
pants were different in terms of years of practice experi-
ence, gender, and practice location. However, we did
not find years of practice experience or gender to be
associated with the questionnaire responses.
During three of the focus groups the Canadian SARS
experience was mentioned. SARS affected physicians in
Central Canada mostly. Therefore, despite the under-
representation from Central Canada, public health con-
cerns that were most pertinent to that geographic area
were still well represented during the discussions.
An important limitation of our study was that it was
conducted with family physicians in Canada. Our resul-
tant model will not necessarily apply without modifica-
tion to other jurisdictions with different socio-cultural
and legal contexts, and to different specialties. However,
we have provided a testable theoretical model as a result
of this work, and this model provides a basis for future
research to examine the factors that affect the disclosure
of information for public health purposes. Whether this
theoretical model is generalizable beyond the specific
context that we studied remains an empirical question.
The pandemic H1N1 influenza outbreak had relatively
mild morbidity and mortality, which may explain why
the participating physicians retained strong concerns
about data disclosures of patient data. It is arguable that
had the outbreak been more severe, or had more serious
health consequences, their views on privacy may have
shifted more towards greater willingness to share data
with public health.
Implementing our recommendations would facilitate
disclosure of patient information for public health pur-
poses, but there are other barriers beyond privacy that
would need to be addressed, for example, resources for
reporting. Therefore, dealing with the privacy concerns
may not be sufficient by itself to improve reporting to
public health.
Conclusions
Privacy concerns by providers have been a barrier to
disclosing patient information for public health pur-
poses. This is the case even for mandated notifiable dis-
ease reporting. We conducted a mixed-methods study
with Canadian family doctors to understand the privacy
barriers which could potentially influence family physi-
cians’ reporting of patient-level surveillance data to
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H1N1 influenza outbreak.
We found that Canadian family doctors do have con-
cerns about patient privacy and about the disclosure of
information that may be reflective of their own perfor-
mance. Privacy is only one of a number of factors that
affects their willingness to disclose patient data. We
have formulated a conceptual model explaining how
certain actions can facilitate the disclosure of health
information by family physicians. The model contains a
number of testable hypotheses, and also provides con-
crete recommendations for activities that are expected
to increase the physicians’ intention to disclose patient
information to public health. In future work, we plan to
perform confirmatory studies of this conceptual model.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Summary of Health Reporting Literature.A
literature review of empirical studies evaluating the extent to which
providers report communicable diseases where reporting is mandated.
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